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Banking Law*
Scorr L. BAENA** AND KEVIN MURRAY***
With the congressional enactment of the Financial Institu-
tions Regulatory Act and the International Banking Act, 1978 can
justifiably be labeled a landmark year in terms of banking legisla-
tion. The author discusses these important federal enactments
and analyzes their impact upon the Florida banking market. Spe-
cial emphasis is given to the interrelationship between state and
federal banking regulations in light of the new federal legislation
and recent decisions. In addition, significant judicial and legisla-
tive developments occurring on a state level during the survey
period are considered.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The political and economic emergence of the Florida banking
industry continued in 1978, although there was a significant lapse
in legislative activity on the state level. National banking associa-
tions are still being attracted to the city of Miami in impressive
numbers, to such an extent that Miami is now second only to New
York City in terms of the number of domiciliary Edge Act banks.'
Additionally, many foreign banks have recently immigrated to
Miami as a result of the International Banking Law enacted by the
Florida Legislature last year.2
On the horizon is the prospect of even more activity of this sort
in view of the enactment by Congress of the International Banking
Act.' There is also some indication that present restrictions on the
acceptance of deposits by international banking agencies in this
state will be relaxed.'
The growth and prosperity of domestic institutions, however,
was thwarted during 1978 due to an economic downturn. While the
country's economy has remained stubbornly buoyant, interest rates
have soared. During the month of November, the discount rate set
by the Federal Reserve Board reached a record high.' As a result,
virtually all segments of the economy, including both public and
private sectors, have been forced to pay dearly for the use of money.
For banks and savings and loan associations the tight money situa-
tion has reached grave proportions.
During 1978 the sentiment of bankers across the state was that
there was little or no profitability in lending money given the slight
margin that existed between the institutions' cost for money and the
1. An Edge Act bank is a federally chartered institution organized for the purpose of
engaging in international or foreign banking. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-631 (1970). There are
presently 14 Edge Act banks located in the city of Miami and more are expected. See Rus-
sell, State Bankers Fear Competition From Large US., Foreign Banks, Miami Herald, Mar.
17, 1979, § C, at 7, col. 3.
2. FLA. STAT. § 659.67 (1977). As of this writing, 12 international banking corporations
have obtained approval to open representative offices or agencies in the state. See Baron,
State Foreign-Bank Dilemma: Change Law or Lose Control, Miami Herald, Feb. 11, 1979, §
F, at 1, col. 1.
3. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
4. Conversation with Gerri R. Dolan, Deputy Comptroller of Florida (Nov. 14, 1978); see
Baron, supra note 2, at 1. For the Florida statute under which international banks within the
state are regulated, see FLA. STAT. § 659.67 (1977).
5. On November 1, 1978, United States authorities implemented various efforts "to
correct what President Carter termed 'the excessive decline of the dollar.' "64 FED. REs. BuLL.
939 (1978). Part of the November 1 package included a one percentage point increase in the
Federal Reserve discount rate to an historic high of nine and one-half percent. Id. at 940-41.
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rates which they could charge to accord with the usury statutes.0 In
response, and with great trepidation, financial institutions scruti-
nized their options under and, indeed, some employed the interest
rate parity law enacted in 1977.1 Although this law as originally
enacted was intended to promote competitive equality among li-
censed lenders,' its application served as a cushion during a period
of economic downswings.
II. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REGULATORY Acr
Of national importance is the'enactment of the Financial Insti-
tutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978.1 Dubbed
the "Bert Lance Act," the statute became effective in March of
1979,10 and has as one of its primary objectives the curtailment of
insider abuse of financial institutions. The Act emphasizes the duty
of insiders with respect to their institutions and increases accounta-
bility for breaches of that duty." The Act further provides for an
extension of federal regulatory authority over interest rates on de-
posits and accounts in depository institutions. Critics object that
the Act "imposes a new layer of regulations on an already overregu-
lated industry without substantially reducing some of the
'problems' the legislation was intended to correct . . . .The un-
6. FLA. STAT. §§ 687.01-.12, 516.18-.21 (1977).
7. FLA. STAT. § 687.12 (1977). Under this statute any lender permitted to do business in
Florida is authorized to charge interest at "the maximum rate of interest permitted by law
to be charged on similar loans or extensions of credit made by any lender or creditor in the
State of Florida." Id.
8. See Baena & Romanchuck, Banking Law: Survey of Florida Developments, 32 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 763, 764-65 (1978).
9. Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.). The Act contains 20 titles which affect the various federal banking agencies: the
Comptroller of the Currency; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve; the Federal Home Loan Bank Board; and the National Credit
Union Administration. Among other things, the Act seeks to upgrade and sharpen the federal
financial regulatory scheme by expanding agency authority and establishing machinery for
better coordination among the financial supervisory agencies. Additionally, it attempts to
curtail preferential treatment to bank insiders and provide customers of financial institutions
with greater substantive rights. See generally HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN
AFFAIRS, REPORT ON H.R. 13471, H.R. Doc. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 1-7, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9273 [hereinafter cited as House REPORT].
10. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-630, § 2101, 92 Stat. 3741 [hereinafter cited as Financial Institutions Regulatory Act].
Generally, provisions of the Act became effective on March 10, 1979; however, certain provi-
sions of the statute had separate effective dates.
11. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 10-16.
12. See generally id., at 16-26.
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scrupulous always will find ways in which to bend regulations to
accomplish their purposes."' 3
A. Supervisory Authority Over Depository Institutions
Title I of the Act grants new supervisory powers to federal regu-
latory agencies which monitor depository institutions. 4 These agen-
cies may now invoke civil money penalties, issue "cease and desist"
orders, and remove directors and officers where there is a showing
of "personal dishonesty" or "willful or continuing disregard" for the
safety of the bank."' Previously, supervisory powers were limited in
that they could only be employed against institutions and not
against individuals. 6
Additionally, title I prohibits a bank from lending or extending
credit to insiders, i.e., directors, officers or persons owning or con-
trolling more than ten percent of any class of voting securities of the
lender bank in excess of $25,000, unless the loan is approved in
advance by a majority of disinterested directors. 7 Loans above the
prescribed limit to companies controlled by insiders or to political
committees from which they might benefit are also prohibited."
Regardless of the amount, any loan or extension of credit to an
insider must be made on substantially the same terms as those
prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with others, and
may not involve more than the normal risk of repayment or present
other unfavorable features." Furthermore, to insure that improper
13. Letter from Congressman Richard Kelly to John Milstead, Executive Vice President
of the Florida Bankers Association (Nov. 1, 1978).
14. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, §§ 101-112, 92 Stat. 3641
(1978) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The agencies affected are: the
Comptroller of the Currency (national banks and banks located in the District of Columbia);
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (state member banks and bank holding
companies); the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (state banks
which are not members of the Federal Reserve System but are insured by FDIC); the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (savings and loan holding companies and institutions which insure
accounts with the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation); and the National Credit
Union Administration (credit unions which insure accounts with the National Credit Union
Administration).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 501a (1976). This section provides for the
forfeiture of a national bank's franchise for failure to comply with provisions of the chapter.
While the Federal Reserve Board had no authority over the individuals, directors and officers
were liable in an individual capacity for all damages sustained in consequence of a violation
of the Act.
17. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 104, 92 Stat. 3644 (1978)
(to be codified in 12 U.S.C. § 375b).
18. Id.
19. Id. Prior to the enactment of the Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, a prohibitory
[Vol. 33:757
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credit extensions do not occur in other forms, the Act mandates an
absolute prohibition against the payment of an overdraft on an
account of an executive officer or director.2"
While the Act attempts to objectify terms on which insiders
may obtain credit from their respective institutions, it fails to offer
any definition for such terms as "normal risk of repayment." The
legislative history indicates that self-dealing and insider abuses are
the leading cause of banking problems and failures.2  Whether the
judiciary will be influenced by the finding and apply a strict level
of scrutiny when reviewing insider transactions remains to be seen.
B. Interlocking Directorates
Title II of the Act22 attempts to deal with the anticompetitive
environment which is fostered by interlocking directorships.23 In this
regard, it expands existing prohibitions on bank interlocks" to in-
clude interlocks between other depository institutions: banks, sav-
ings and loan associations, credit unions, trust companies, coopera-
tive banks, industrial banks, homestead associations, building and
loan associations, mutual savings banks and their holding compa-
nies.1
scheme limiting conditions under which loans could be made to the executive officers of banks
did exist. 12 U.S.C. § 375a (1976). Any extension of credit to a bank executive would be
permissible only if "the bank would be authorized to make it to borrowers other than its
officers" and "on terms not more favorable than those afforded other borrowers." Id. The
Financial Institutions Regulatory Act supplements the existing regulation in that it adds
directors and 10% control persons to its list of insiders. Because conditions are only imposed
on loans over $25,000 under the Act, presumably directors and 10% control persons could still
receive favored treatment on credit transactions under the $25,000 limit.
20. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 104, 92 Stat. 3644 (1978)
(to be codified in 12 U.S.C. § 375b).
21. See HoUsE REPOgr, supra note 9, at 11. The House committee rejected a proposal to
exempt state chartered federally insured banks from the insider borrowing restrictions based
on a finding that 80% of the failures between 1970 and 1976 were state chartered banks.
22. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 201-209, 92 Stat. 3672
(1978) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
23. The legislative history behind title II suggests an attempt to create a procompetitive
environment among financial institutions. The necessity of stimulating competition in an
industry where limited chartering and regulatory protection exist was especially considered
by Congress. It was determined that interlocks could have an adverse effect on the flow of
capital to the detriment of local communities. Additionally, Congress concluded that new
competition and innovative banking techniques at the retail level would be of little benefit
to the customer "if the financial institutions controlling these services and serving these areas
have the same tight membership on their boards of directors, making the same policies, and
balancing their conflicting interests." HousE REroirr, supra note 9, at 14.
24. Clayton Act, § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976).
25. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 202, 92 Stat. 3672
(1978).
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Focusing on the geography and population of an area in con-
junction with the total assets of the subject institutions, the Act
prohibits interlocking management when (a) the subject institu-
tions are in the same standard metropolitan statistical area in the
case of depository institutions with more than $20 million in assets,2"
or are in the same city, town or village regardless of assets; 27 or (b)
one of the subject institutions has total assets exceeding $1 billion
and the other(s) in excess of $500 million, irrespective of the geo-
graphical area.28 Existing interlocks are, however, grandfathered for
a ten year period.2'
Authority to enforce compliance with title II is granted to the
primary regulatory agency for each type of depository institution.
3
0
These supervisory agencies are authorized to either issue cease and
desist orders3 or to refer violations to the Attorney General to en-
force compliance 'with the title. 2 Authority is also vested in the
agencies to promulgate rules and regulations affecting interlocks.
33
Under this rulemaking authority agencies may exempt interlocks
from the statutory prohibitions of title 1I.1 An exemption to the title
should only be granted, however, upon a finding that an otherwise
impermissible interlock has a procompetitive effect. 35
26. Id. § 203(1).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 204.
29. Id. § 206. The grandfather provision, however, does not apply to interlocks which
would otherwise be in violation of the title under § 8 of the Clayton Act. 12 U.S.C. § 19 (1970).
Section 206 of title H is silent as to interlocks which may violate § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act as applied to nonbank depository institutions. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). In its
pertinent part, § 5(a)(2) of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides that: "The Commis-
sion is empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, except
banks, . . . from using unfair.methods of competing in or affecting commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." (emphasis added).
While it has been the position of the Federal Trade Commission that director interlocks
between savings and loan associations and banks in the same city violate § 5, the courtshave
never squarely decided the issue. Thus it is conceivable that the Commission could proceed
against interlocks between nonbank depository institutions under § 5 on grounds that § 206
of title II was not intended to insulate otherwise grandfathered interlocks from challenge
under other antitrust statutes. See H. Williams, "Grandfathering" of S & ILBank Interlocks
Under the New Financial Institutions Regulatory Act-Some Considerations for Association
Counsel (Oct. 25, 1978) (unpublished work on file at U. MIAMI L. Rzv.).
30. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 207, 92 Stat. 3674
(1978). For a list of these regulatory agencies and the institutions which they supervise see
note 15 supra.
31. Id. § 208.
32. Id. § 207.
33. Id. § 209.
34. Id.




Title III of the Act gives the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC) express authority over the establishment and operation
of foreign branches and the acquisition of shares of foreign banks by
state nonmember-insured banks." State banks insured by FDIC
must now obtain the prior written consent of the FDIC in order to
establish foreign branches. 7 The Act does not, however, completely
preempt state regulation in this area. The practice of foreign
branching is still subject to initial state authorization.38
Although title Ill is labeled "Foreign Branching," many of its
significan provisions have nothing to do with the operation of for-
eign banks. Most importantly, the title gives FDIC authority to
write regulations for laws which they enforce. 3 Additionally, it ex-
pands the subpoena power for all banking supervisory agencies in
conducting investigations and examinations, 0 as well as establish-
ing protective sanctions for examiners against intimidation and
threats."
D. Credit Union Restructuring
Under title V, the Federal Credit Union Act 2 has been
amended by the creation of a three-member board in lieu of an
Administrator. 3 This restructuring of the National Credit Union
Administration upgrades the agency status to a stature equal to that
of the other financial institutional regulatory agencies and other
independent agencies which operate under the direction of a board."
36. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, §§ 301-311, 92 Stat. 3675
(1978) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The regulatory authority granted
to the FDIC under the title is similar to that exercised by the Federal Reserve with respect
to foreign branches and foreign bank acquisitions of member banks. See generally 12 U.S.C.
§§ 601-603 (1976).
37. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 301, 92 Stat. 3676
(1978).
38. See id.
39. Id. § 309. Under this provision FDIC is authorized "[t]o prescribe by its Board of
Directors such rules and regulations as it may deem necessary to carry out the provisions of
this Act or of any other law which it has the responsibility of administering or enforcing
.Id.
40. Id. § 305.
41. Id. § 307.
42. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1775 (1976).
43. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, §§ 501-508, 92 Stat. 3680
(1978) (to be codified in 12 U.S.C. § 1752a). Previously, the National Credit Union was
directed by a single Administrator.
44. For example, the Federal Reserve System, the Home Loan Bank System, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade
19791
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In addition, the title provides for the assessment of fees to be
paid by each federal credit union which will be used to defray the
operating expenses of the Board and to finance the examination and
supervision of member credit unions."5
E. Change in Control
To correct what was thought to be "[o]ne of the most glaring
gaps in the regulatory structure [of] our depository institutions,"46
titles VIII and VII"I prescribe new rules regarding the transfer of
ownership of banks and savings and loan associations." The overrid-
ing principle of these titles is that one who acquires control of a
financial institution should undergo the same scrutiny as an appli-
cant for a new charter.5s It should be noted that under both titles it
is not necessary for the respective supervisory agency to approve an
acquisition; they are only given power to disapprove."
Before anyone can acquire control of a bank or savings and loan
he must file a written notice with the appropriate agency no less
than sixty days prior to the transfer.2 For the purpose of these titles
the concept of control is deemed to encompass the power to vote
twenty-five percent or more of the voting stock or to direct the
Commission all have a board of directors or a commission which directs the operation of the
agency.
45. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 507, 92 Stat. 3682
(1978).
46. HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 19.
47. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 601-602, 92 Stat. 3683
(1978) (to be codified in 12 U.S.C. § 18170)) (change in bank control).
48. Id. 9H 701-703 (to be codified in 12 U.S.C. § 1730) (change in savings and loan
control).
49. Both titles provide the same regulatory scheme over transfers. Any difference be-
tween the two titles is merely a reflection of the need for language that recognizes differences
in the respective regulatory structures.
50. See generally HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 19-22. Congress was concerned with
the fact that prior approval by the appropriate regulatory authority was not necessary before
a transfer of ownership could transpire, while such approval was necessary when the institu-
tion was chartered, when it applied for insurance of accounts, and when it planned to merge,
establish a branch or become part of a holding company. Id. at 19.
51. See Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, §§ 602, 703, 92 Stat.
3683 (1978). Section 602 of title VI amends subsection (j) of § 7 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act. 12 U.S.C. § 18170) (1976). Section 703 of title VII amends paragraph (6) of §
407(1) of the National Housing Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1730(l)(6) (1976).
52. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, §§ 602, 703, 92 Stat. 3683
(1978). Notice of transfers of ownership should be filed with the FDIC for state nonmember
insured banks, with the Comptroller of Currency for National Banks, with the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve for state member banks and bank holding companies and
with the Federal Home Loan Board for savings and loans and their holding companies.
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management or policies of an institution.5 3 An acquisition comes
within these regulations if it is effected by purchase, assignment,
transfer, pledge or other disposition of voting stock.5
The notice required to be filed with the agency must contain
detailed disclosure concerning the acquisition plan and the persons
involved.55 Based on this filing the agency involved may disapprove
the proposed acquisition for any one of the following reasons: (1) the
acquisition would result in a monopoly or be in furtherance of an
attempt to monopolize the banking or savings and loan business; (2)
the acquisition would substantially lessen competition in a section
of the country and such anticompetitive effects are not clearly out-
weighed by the public interest; (3) the financial condition of an
acquiring party jeopardizes the financial stability of the institution
or seriously threatens the interests of the depositors; (4) the compe-
tence, experience or integrity of any acquiring party or designated
management personnel is not in the interest of the depositors of the
bank; or (5) the acquiring party fails, neglects, or refuses to furnish
the required information."
Should the regulatory agency involved determine that the pro-
posed acquisition warrants a denial, review of that determination is
provided.57 First, a hearing must be conducted at the agency level58
and then, upon an adverse determination, the acquiring party may
obtain review in the United States court of appeals closest to the
home office of the institution sought to be acquired.59
Additionally, both titles provide that, whenever a bank or sav-
ings and loan association makes a loan or loans secured by twenty-
five percent or more of an insured institution's outstanding voting
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. Notice filed in accordance with these titles must include: (1) information on the
acquiring person's background, business activities and any pertinent legal proceedings in
which they might be involved; (2) statements of their net worth; (3) description of the terms
and conditions of the acquisition; (4) detailed information about the financing of the acquisi-
tion; (5) descriptions of any plans or proposals to make major changes in the institution being
acquired; (6) the identity and background of anyone employed to solicit stockholders about
the acquisition; (7) copies of tender offers or advertisements about tender offers; and (8) any
other relevant information as determined by regulation or specific request by the agency. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. If the agency denies a proposed acquisition, it must notify the applicant within
three days of its decision accompanied with a statement setting forth the basis for the denial.





UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
stock, that fact must be promptly reported to the appropriate fed-
eral regulatory agency.10
F. Correspondent Accounts
The misuse of bank funds through correspondent accounts has
long been a source of concern. The chief criticism is that oftentimes
loans were made on preferential terms when compared with transac-
tions involving individuals who did not have similar account rela-
tionships.' Moreover, it has been found that such accounts have
often been little more than a means of securing loans for bank insi-
ders rather than serving as balances to facilitate check clearing and
provide other services associated with a correspondent relation-
ship. 2 Title VIII of the Financial Institutions Regulatory Act 3 seeks
to prevent these abuses. The title adopts the same standard applied
to loans to insiders from their own banks,6" that is: loans based upon
a correspondent relationship must be made on substantially the
same terms as those prevailing for comparable transactions with
others 8 and not involve more than normal risk.
Under the title, a bank which holds a correspondent account for
another bank may not make a loan to an executive officer, director,
or ten percent control person unless the terms and conditions of the
loan are nonpreferential16 Similarly, a bank which has a correspon-
dent account at another bank can only make loans to insiders of that
bank on nonpreferential terms. 7 Furthermore, a bank may not es-
tablish a correspondent relationship with any bank where it has
loans outstanding with inside persons of that bank unless such exist-
ing loans are nonpreferential.
Bank insiders must make annual written reports to the board
of directors of their bank if they borrowed funds from any bank with
whom a corresponding relationship existed. 8 These reports must
include the maximum amount of indebtedness, the interest rate, as
60. Id.
61. See Hous. REPoRT, supra note 9, at 13.
62. Id.
63. Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 801, 92 Stat. 3690 (1978). Section 801 of title VIII amends §
106(b) of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 106(b),
84 Stat. 1766 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1976)).
64. See Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 801, 92 Stat. 3690
(1978). See generally House REPORT, supra note 9, at 13-14.
65. See Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 104, 92 Stat. 3644
(1978).





well as the other terms and conditions of the loan." The directors
of each bank must then compile those reports, make them publicly
available and forward them to the appropriate regulatory agency.70
G. Disclosure of Material Facts
Title IX of the Act" supplements the reporting requirements
which title XIII prescribes for borrowing by bank insiders72 It re-
quires all insured banks to file an annual report with the regulatory
agency which supervises its activities.7 3 This report must include the
names of all stockholders owning, controlling or voting more than
ten percent of any class of the bank's voting securities, the names
of all executive officers with such holdings, the aggregate amount
of outstanding credit to such inside persons, companies controlled
by them or campaign committees established for their benefit."4
Copies of the reports filed under this provision must be made avail-
able to the public upon request.7 5 These disclosure requirements
apply only to banks and do not pertain to other types of depository
institutions which come under federal regulation.
H. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
Title X of the Act establishes the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council." This body will serve as a coordinating link
between the various banking agencies." The Council is intended to
69. For the purpose of this title, loans to companies controlled by a bank insider and
loans to political committees which inure to the benefit of the bank insider are to be included
in calculating the maximum indebtedness. Id.
70. Id. For a list of the appropriate regulatory agencies which supervise the particular
type of banking institution involved, see note 52 supra.
71. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 901, 92 Stat. 3693
(1978). Section 901 of title IX amends § 7 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 12 U.S.C. §
1817 (1976).
72. See generally text accompanying notes 66-70 supra. The information required in title
VIII reports would also be included in reports filed under title IX.
73. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 901, 92 Stat. 3693
(1978). For a list of the appropriate regulatory agencies which supervise the particular type
of banking institution involved, see note 52 supra.
74. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 901, 92 Stat. 3693
(1978).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 1004.
77. The lack of coordination among the agencies can readily be seen as problematic if
one were to consider the not unlikely situation where a bank holding company owns subsidi-
ary national banks, state member banks, and state nonmember banks. Here the holding
company would be involved with all three banking regulatory agencies. Nonuniform reporting
and disclosure requirements by the different agencies could easily lead to confusion, duplicity
of work and unnecessary expense.
1979]
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fulfill the "need for better coordination and cooperation among
these agencies" in a banking industry which has become
"sophisticated and complex."78
The Council, to be composed of representatives from the var-
ious regulatory agencies,"' will prescribe uniform principles and
standards for the examination and supervision of all federally char-
tered financial institutions.". In addition, it will recommend proce-
dures which attempt to promote consistency and uniformity in ex-
amination, supervision and reporting for all financial institutions.
I. Right to Financial Privacy
Title XI of the Act" is welcomed by banks and their customers
alike. The sanctity of traditional notions of the banker's duty of
confidentiality is finally codified so that customers now have a legit-
imate expectation of privacy in their financial records and a right
to challenge any attempt by a federal agency to gain access to such
records. Unless the requirements of this title are met, a financial
institution is prohibited from disclosing any customer records.8
2
While the bank customer has the initial burden of making the chal-
lenge, the burden of proof immediately shifts to the federal agency
seeking access.
Under the title, a customer can simply authorize the release of
their financial records." If the customer does not give such authori-
zation, one of the federal agency's alternatives is to proceed through
78. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 24-25.
79. The Council will be composed of five members. They are: the Comptroller of the
Currency; a Governor of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve; the Chairman of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; the Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board; and the Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration Board. Financial
Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1004(a), 92 Stat. 3694 (1978).
80. Id. § 1006(a).
81. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, §§ 1101-1121, 92 Stat.
3697 (1978).
82. This title is a congressional reaction to the decision of the Supreme Court in United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 34. In Miller, the Court
held that no fourth amendment right of a depositor is violated by a seizure of bank records
relating to his financial transactions. The Court reached this holding by finding constitutional
standing to challenge the seizure lacking notwithstanding the fact that the Bank Secrecy Act
of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 18296 (1976) required the bank to maintain these records. The Court in
a later decision has suggested that Congress has the prerogative to establish nonconstitutional
barriers to similar abusive intrusions by government officials. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
98 S. Ct. 1970, 1982-83 (1978).




an administrative subpoena or summons,8 or judicial subpoena. A
subpoena will only issue, however, upon a demonstration by the
agency that "there is reason to believe .that the records sought are
relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.""6 Before the
agency can obtain financial records under a subpoena or summons,
a copy must be served upon the customer who then has ten days
from the date of service (or fourteen days from the date of mailing)
within which to file a motion to quash. 7 In addition to consent,
subpoena and summons, a federal agency may seek a search warrant
in order to gain access to a customer's records.8 In order to obtain
a search warrant, however, the agency must demonstrate probable
cause that a crime has been or may be committed.
An agency without subpoena authority over the desired records
may make a formal written request for such records if the request
is authorized by regulation or the head of the agency and is believed
relevant to a legitimate law enforcement purpose, in which case the
request will be treated like a subpoena." The customer has ten days
from the date of service or fourteen days from the date of mailing
to protest the request by means of a motion to quash.9 0
If a customer challenges a subpoena, summons or formal writ-
ten request, the investigative agency must file a response with the
appropriate United States district court." Upon a finding that the
customer is not the object of legitimate law enforcement inquiry,
that no legitimate law enforcement inquiry exists, or that the
agency failed to substantially comply with the title, the process will
be quashed or the request enjoined.2 Otherwise, the agency shall be
84. Id. § 1105.
85. Id. § 1107.
86. Id. H8 1105, 1107.
87. Id. Accompanying the subpoena or summons must be a notice of the procedure which
the customer must follow if he wishes to challenge the agency's efforts to obtain the financial
records. Id.
Section 1105(b) of the committee bill included a provision which would have granted the
Securities and Exchange Commission authority to dispense with the prior notification re-
quirement. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 35. This provision, however, was not included
in the bill as enacted.
88. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1106, 92 Stat. 3700
(1978). Within ninety days after the search warrant is served, notice must be mailed to the
customer's last known address informing him that financial records concerning his transac-
tions have been seized. This notification must include the name of the department or agency
which obtained the records and the purpose for which these records were obtained. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. § 1110(a).
92. Id. § 1110(c).
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entitled to access to the customer's financial records.9 3
Under limited circumstances the customer notice requirements
may be delayed by order.of a judge or magistrate until after the
financial records have been obtained by the inquiring agency. 4 For
a delay order to issue, the judge or magistrate must determine that
the investigation is within the lawful jurisdiction of the agency, that
the records being sought are relevant to a legitimate law enforce-
ment inquiry and that certain exigent circumstances exist." If emer-
gency access is obtained in this manner, however, the inquiring
agency must notify the customer as soon as possible stating the
purpose for which the records were sought and the grounds necessi-
tating the delay of notice."
Financial records obtained under the title may not be trans-
ferred to any other agency or department unless notice of a proposed
transfer is given to the customer. 7 The customer may then challenge
the transfer as if the notice of transfer were a subpoena, summons
or formal request.18
There are several exceptions to the procedure and notice re-
quirements prescribed in the Act, most significant of which are
grand jury subpoenas.99 Moreover, the title does not prohibit the
disclosure of financial records in accordance with procedures au-
thorized by the Internal Revenue Code.'
93. The title does not restrict any right which the financial institution may have to
challenge the request for records. Nothing in the title, however, entitles a customer to assert
the rights of the financial institution. Id. § 1110(f). For a discussion of a customer's lack of
standing to asdert a constitutional challenge where bank records are seized by government
authorities, see note 82 supra.
94. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1109(a), 92 Stat. 3702
(1978).
95. Id. § 1109(a)(1)-1109(a)(3). Permissible circumstances exist only if prenotification
would result in endangering life or physical safety of any person, flight from prosecution,
destruction of or tampering with evidence, intimidation of potential witnesses, or otherwise
seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial or proceeding. Id. §
1109(a) (3)(A)-1109(a)(3)(E).
96. Id. § 1109(c).
97. Id. § 1112(a). The Act makes a distinction between supervisory agencies of financial
institutions and other government agencies or departments. For the purposes of the Act, the
supervisory agencies are: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the National Credit Union
Administration, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Secretary of the Treasury and
any state banking or securities department or agency. Id. § 1101(b). While the Act provides
that information may not be transferred to another government agency without specific
statutory authorization, supervisory agencies may, however, share information. Id. § 1112(d).
98. Id. § 1112(b).
99. Id. § 1120.
100. Id. § 1113(c). For procedures under the Internal Revenue Code, see I.R.C. § 7602.
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Another major improvement brought about by this legislation
is the provision requiring the government to reimburse financial
institutions for costs in assembling and furnishing documents re-
quested after October 1, 1979.""1
J. Electronic Fund Transfers
Title XX of the Act' amends the Consumer Credit Protection
Act'03 "to provide a basic framework establishing the rights, liabili-
ties, and responsibilities of participants in electronic fund transfer
systems."'' Principal among the purposes, however, is the creation
of substantive consumer rights. The regulatory scheme promulgated
by the title covers electronic fund transfers initiated through an
electronic terminal, telephonic instrument, or computer or mag-
netic tape which operates as an authorization to a financial institu-
tion to debit or credit an account.0 5 This would include any transfer
initiated by automated teller machine transactions, direct deposit
or withdrawal facilities, point-of-sale transfers 6 and by telephone
in contemplation of an ongoing practice or in accordance with a
prearranged plan."'
The title requires the financial institution to prepare written
documentation at the time of transfer which shall be made available
to the consumer through periodic statements.08 In addition, it es-
tablishes a procedure for the resolution of errors in electronic trans-
actions. This procedure is activated if, within sixty days after a
statement has been transmitted, the consumer notifies the financial
101. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1115, 92 Stat. 3708
(1978).
102. Id. § 2001 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1693).
103. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691 (1976). The short title for these amendments is the
"Electronic Fund Transfer Act."
104. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 2001, 92 Stat. 3728
(1978). See also S. REP. No. 915, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 9403.
105. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 2001, 92 Stat. 3728
(1978).
106. Point of sale transfers are electronic fund transfers which enable consumers to
transfer money from their bank accounts to a merchant's account instantaneously through
use of a computer terminal at the merchant's store.
107. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 2001, 92 Stat. 3728
(1978). The bill specifically excludes traditional wire transfers between banks, any transac-
tion whose principal purpose is the purchase or sale of securities, and check guarantee and
authorization services, unless such services directly result in a debit to the consumer's bank
account.
108. Id. The required documentation must include the date and amount of the transfer,
the type of transfer, identification of the consumer's accounts involved, identity of any third
party involved in the transfer and identification of the electronic terminal involved.
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institution that he believes that there is an error in his account.'"9
The financial institution is then charged with the duty to complete
an investigation within ten business days and to promptly correct
the matter if it determines that an error did, indeed, occur. "' If the
conclusion of the investigation reveals no mistake, an explanation
of such findings must be mailed to the consumer within three days
of the determination."' Failure by the financial institution to com-
ply with the procedures of this provision or a knowing and willful
determination by the financial institution that no error occurred
when such a conclusion could not reasonably be drawn from the
evidence, entitles the consumer to treble damages."'
On the other hand, consumer liability under the title is limited
to fifty dollars for any unauthorized transfer by card, code or other
means of transfer."' The fifty dollar ceiling, however, increases to
five hundred dollars if the consumer fails to report the unauthorized
transfer within sixty days of the transmittal of an account statement
or within two business days after he learns that the card or means
of access has been lost or stolen."' The financial institution has the
burden of proving that all required disclosures were made by it, that
the transfer was authorized or, if unauthorized, that all conditions
for imposing liability upon the consumer havq been met."'
The title is vigilant of consumer rights in several other respects.
For example, the issuance of valid cards or other means of access is
109. Id.
110. Id. To avoid investigation deadlines imposed by the title, the financial institution
may provisionally recredit the consumer's account for the amount alleged to be in error. This
alternative permits the financial institution up to 45 days to resolve the matter. During the
period, the consumer would have full use of the recredited funds.
111. Id. The title enumerates a list of errors which are grounds to activate the error
resolution procedures. These include computational errors, the incorrect transfer or receipt
of funds and unauthorized transfers and statement omissions. In addition, the title authorizes
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to prescribe regulations to define other errors.
112. Id. Damages would be three times the amount of the error.
113. Id. Congress felt that this was perhaps the most important protection contained in
the bill. S. REP. No. 915, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 9403, 9407.
114. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 2001, 92 Stat. 3728
(1978). Extenuating circumstances such as hospitalization or extended travel may toll the
running of these limitation periods.
115. Id. The $50 limitation on liability applies only where there has been a bona fide
unauthorized transfer. If the consumer authorized the transfer, derived any benefits from it
or was engaged in fraudulent conduct, the full liability would then fall on him. By requiring
the financial institution to absorb any loss above the $50 limitation in cases of a bona fide
unauthorized transfer, Congress felt that this would create a sufficient incentive for financial
institutions to secure an efficient electronic transfer system. See S. REP. No. 95-915, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEws 9403, 9408.
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limited to renewals and responses to a consumer's application."'
Moreover, no agreement which purports to restrict any right con-
ferred to a consumer under the title will be valid." 7 Failure to com-
ply with any provision of the title can result in civil liability or, if
committed knowingly and willfully, criminal liability.18
The consumer protection afforded by this title is meant to serve
only as the minimum standard. States may create greater rights in
favor of consumers. Where state law is inconsistent with the federal
scheme, the Federal Reserve Board must determine the applicable
standard by examining which law affords the greater protection."'
With respect to unauthorized transfers, under Florida law a
financial institution will not be liable if it has failed to maintain
reasonable procedures to protect against such a loss.120 Such a de-
fense does not exist under the new federal law, although threshold
liability for the first fifty dollars of loss is imposed on the con-
sumer.'
Another defense available to the financial institution under
Florida law arises where the customer's negligence has contributed
to the unauthorized transfer.' This defense, however, seems to be
tempered by the federal statute which limits consumer liability to
five hundred dollars and then only for failure to notify within the
time limits set forth in the statute. 23
Im. THE FEDERAL INTERNATIONAL BANKING AcT
Florida's International Banking Law24 is now complemented by
the federally-enacted International Banking Act of 1978.125 While
116. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 2001, 92 Stat. 3728
(1978).
117. Id.
118. Id. Civil liability, exclusive of the treble damage provision for failure to follow error
resolution procedure and the proximate damage provision for failure to make a correct timely
transfer when properly instructed to do so, must be at least $100, but no more than $1,000.
119. Id.
120. See FLA. STAT. § 659.062 (13)(c) (1977). The Florida statute applies to electronic
transfers by remote service terminals and point of sale terminals. It does not cover, as does
the federal statute, transactions initiated by phone pursuant to a prearranged plan and direct
deposit and automatic payment transaction.
121. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 2001, 92 Stat. 3728
(1978); see text accompanying note 113 supra.
122. See FLA. STAT. § 659.062(13)(c) (1977).
123. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 2001, 92 Stat. 3728
(1978); see text accompanying notes 114-15 supra.
124. FLA. STAT. § 659.67 (1977). See generally Baena & Romanchuck, Banking Law:
Survey of Florida Developments, 32 U. MuMI L. Rv. 763, 765-69 (1978).
125. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (to be codified
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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the purpose of Florida's law is to establish and promote Florida as
a center of international commerce and trade,2 ' the federal statute
seeks to establish "the principle of parity of treatment between
foreign and domestic banks in like circumstances."' 27 Additionally,
the new federal law includes amendments to the National Bank
Act' and the Edge Act."'
A. Federal Branches and Agencies
As a result of the Act, a foreign bank may now establish one or
more agencies' or branches13' in any of the United States so long
as it does not operate a branch or agency in that state under state
law and so long as the state of establishment does not have laws of
prohibition. 32 Notice that state laws need not expressly permit the
establishment of a federal branch or agency. 3 ' Also note that there
is no limitation on the number of branches or agencies within a
single state (unlike under Florida law'), although there is a pro-
scription against the establishment of both agencies and branches
in the same state. 3 5
In general, operations of a federal branch or agency shall be
conducted with the same rights and privileges, and is subject to the
same duties, restrictions, penalties, liabilities, conditions, and limi-
tations that would apply to a national banking association doing
business at the same location. 3 ' The Comptroller of Currency is
given primary examination, regulatory and supervisory authority
over federal branches and agencies.'37
126. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON COMMERCE, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL BANKING (1977).
127. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL
BANKING ACT OF 1978, S. REP. No. 95-1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [19781 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2827, 2828 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
128. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-362, § 2, 92 Stat. 608 (amending
12 U.S.C. § 72 (1976)).
129. Id. § 3 (amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-632 (1976)).
130. An "agency" is defined as "any office or any place of business of a foreign bank
located in any State of the United States at which credit balances are maintained incidental
to or arising out of the exercise of balancing powers, checks are paid, or money is lent but at
which deposits may not be accepted from citizens or residents of the United States." Id. §
1(b)(1) (to be codified in 12 U.S.C. § 3101(1)).
131. A "branch" is defined as "any office or any place of business of a foreign bank
located in any State of the United States at which deposits are received." Id. § 1(b)(3) (to
be codified in 12 U.S.C. § 3101(3)).
132. Id. § 4(a) (to be codified in 12 U.S.C. § 3102(a)).
133. See id. § 4(a)(2).
134. Id. § 4(h).
135. Id. § 4(e).
136. Id. § 4(b).
137. FLA. STAT. § 659.67.
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B. Interstate Banking Operations
The reports and testimony before Congress on the International
Banking Act of 1978 echoed a single overriding concern. Bankers
and officials alike were fearful that unless subtle but nonetheless
effective restrictions were imposed on interstate branching by for-
eign banks, a network of full service banking offices throughout the
country could be established by the world's largest foreign banks
and create a national banking system in which only the largest
domestic banks could compete.'38
Therefore, as a stop-gap measure, the Act provides that in the
case of a branch to be established outside of a foreign bank's home
state of operations, which is a designation left to the foreign bank,
such branch would be able to accept such credit balances as would
agencies under relevant state and federal law. 3' Yet, with respect
to deposits, such a branch would be limited to accepting the types
of foreign source and international banking and finance-related de-
posits permissible for Edge Act corporations. 4 "
C. Edge Act Corporations
As it pertains to Edge Act corporations, the International Bank-
ing Act of 1978 expressly declares its purpose to be:
[T]o provide for the establishment of international banking and
financial corporations operating under Federal supervision with
powers sufficiently broad to enable them to compete effectively
with.similar foreign-owned institutions in the United States and
abroad; to afford to the United States exporter and importer in
particular, and to United States commerce, industry and agricul-
ture in general, at all times a means of financing international
trade, especially United States exports; to foster the participa-
tion by regional and smaller banks throughout the United States
in the provision of international banking and financing services
to all segments of United States agriculture, commerce, and in-
dustry and, in particular small business and farming concerns; to
stimulate competition in the provision of international banking
and financing services throughout the United States; and, in con-
junction with each of the preceding purposes, to facilitate and
stimulate the export of United States goods, wares, merchandise,
commodities and services to achieve a sound United States inter-
national trade position."'
138. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON COMMERCE, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL BANKING (1977).
139. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3103(a) (West Supp. 1978).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 611(a).
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Accordingly, the Federal Reserve Board is directed to promulgate
revised regulations to accomplish these objectives by early 1979.142
Further, the requirement that all Edge Act corporation directors be
United States citizens is eliminated so as to enable foreign-owned
banks to penetrate the United States banking community.
4 3
The amendments seek to eliminate restrictions which have
worked to the competitive disadvantage of Edge Act corporations.
Accordingly, the Edge Act was amended in two substantial respects:
First, the requirement that all Edge Act corporation directors be
United States citizens was eliminated."' Second, the requirement
that the ratio of an Edge Act corporation's equity to liabilities not
be less than ten percent was also eliminated."'
Additionally, Congress directed the Federal Reserve Board to
promulgate revisions to regulation K1' which pertains to Edge Act
corporations. In response to this congressional mandate, the Board
has issued a proposed comprehensive revision of regulation K." 7
Included among the revisions set forth in the proposal are: the crea-
tion of a class' 8 of customers categorically deemed to be engaged in
international business transactions; the establishment of Edge Act
domestic branches;'" the increase of the ceiling on single invest-
ments; 10 reduction of the permissible ratio of equity to liabilities to
six percent;' 5' and authority to engage in financing the production
of goods in the United States if they are to be exported.'52
The proposed revisions to regulation K have not overwhelmed
bankers, to say the least. Indeed, the Florida Bankers Association
adopted a terse resolution urging the Federal Reserve Board to with-
142. Id.
143. Id. § 614.
144. Id. § 3(c).
145. Id. § 3(d).
146. 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.1-.112 (1978).
147. 44 Fed. Reg. 10,509 (1979).
148. Under this proposal "customers which, on a nonconsolidated basis have more than
two-thirds of their purchases or sales in international commerce, would be able to obtain full
deposit and other banking services from Edge Corporations." Id. For current regulation see
12 C.F.R. § 211.7 (1978).
149. Under existing regulations ifa firm wishes to provide international banking services
at different locations in the United States it must incorporate separate Edge Act corporations.
12 C.F.R. § 211.6(a) (1978).
150. The current ceiling imposed upon investments in foreign companies without prior
Board approval is $500,000 or 25% ownership interest. 12 C.F.R. § 211.8(a) (1978). The
proposal would raise the general consent limitation to $2 million. 44 Fed. Reg. 10,510 (1979).
151. The present ratio is 10%. 12 C.F.R. § 211.9(c) (1978).
152. Under current regulations, Edge Act corporations may finance the shipment and
storage of goods for export, but not their production. Id. § 211.7(d).
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draw the proposed rules.' 5" The big fear, of course, is gravitation
toward national branch banking. 5' The irony is that if such a system
were to evolve, the competitive equality created by Congress be-
tween Edge Act corporations and foreign-owned ipstitutions would
strike an imbalance of equality as between those institutions and
domestics.
D. National Banks
To further neutralize any advantage that national banks might
otherwise have over foreign banks, the International Banking Act of
1978 grants the Comptroller of the Currency the right to waive the
requirement that all directors of a national banking association be
United States citizens. 5 ' Under this section, however, the Comp-
troller only has discretion to waive the citizenship requirement as
it would apply to directors of a national bank which is an affiliate
or subsidiary of a foreign bank, and only as to less than fifty percent
of the directors.' It is thought that this provision will facilitate
foreign bank chartering and acquisition of national bank subsidiar-
ies "without unduly compromising the principle of local ownership
and control."' 57
IV. AcTivrrEs OF INTERNATIONAL BANKS IN FLORIDA
Since the enactment of Florida's International Banking Law in
1977,'"1 the Department of Banking and Finance has adopted rules
governing the range of permissible activities in which international
banking corporations may engage.'59 The rules are particularly clear
with regard to the permissible activities of agencies and representa-
tive offices which operate under state law. As to the former, the rules
expressly provide that loans shall not be made from agencies
"unless such loans are clearly related to and usual in international
or foreign business and financing international commerce."' To aid
in interpreting this standard, the rules further provide that "[r]eal
estate loans, automobile loans, retail installment contract financ-
ing, loans for the purchase of securities and other essentially domes-
153. See Russell, supra note 1.
154. Id.
155. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 2, 92 Stat. 608 (amending
12 U.S.C. § 72 (1976)).
156. Id.
157. SENATE REPORT, supra note 127, at 3.
158. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-157 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 659.67 (1977)).
159. FLA. AEmmn. CODE § 3C-15.01-.05 (1978).
160. Id. § 3C-15.03.
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tic loans will not fall within the category of permissible activities."''
The rules establish a general prohibition against the taking of
deposits by agencies of international banking corporations. Agencies
may, however, maintain credit balances for the account of others
which necessarily arise, or are incidental to, the exercise of their
lawful powers. The rules set forth a veritable laundry list of what
might constitute permissible credit balances."2 The gist of the ex-
amples set forth is that the balances must be transitory in nature
as opposed to being tantamount to demand deposits. 3
As for representative offices, the rules make it clear that solici-
tation and even negotiation of "loans, deposits, letters of credit and
other business" by these offices for the international banking corpo-
ration which they represent are permissible activities."6 ' Addition-
ally, representative offices may do research and act as a liaison
between the home office and its customers in Florida." 5 A represent-
ative office may not, however, function as a branch office of a
bank. 6
Finally, the rules have been expanded to provide a method of
establishing that a bank domiciled in Florida would be permitted
to maintain facilities or exercise powers similar to those permitted
under the international banking law in the country in which the
applicant is organized, as is required under that law."7 The rules
provide that such proof may consist of data as to the existing activi-
ties of foreign banks in that country, an opinion of a licensed mem-
ber of that country's legal profession, or a certificate of an appropri-
ate bank supervisory authority of that country." 8
Notwithstanding the expansive amendments to the Edge Act 6 '
161. Id.
162. These funds are: (1) proceeds of loans to customers where such proceeds are not
immediately disbursed; (2) proceeds of incoming remittances; (3) proceeds of collections
made for customers' accounts; (4) funds delivered by customers to settle letters of credit
accounts with the banking agency prior to settlement date; (5) proceeds of export bills negoti-
ated; (6) cash collateral resulting from collections arising out of a loan transaction with a
customer; (7) undisbursed proceeds of a loan retained by the banking agency in the nature
of a compensating balance from the borrowing customer; (8) funds delivered prior to execu-
tion of money transfers undertaken on behalf of customers; (9) funds delivered or received
on account of the purchase or sale of securities for the account of customers; and (10) funds
delivered or received from customers to cover currency transactions or as the result of cur-
rency transactions on behalf of customers. Id. § 3C-15.03(1).
163. Id. See also [1977] FLA. Arr'y GEN. ANNUAL REP. 272.
164. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 3C-15.04 (1978).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. § 3C-15.05; see FLA. STAT. § 659.67(4)(b) (1977).
168. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 3C-15.05 (1978).
169. 44 Fed. Reg. 10,511 (1979) (proposed rule § 211.3).
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and the proposed revisions to regulation K'70 and the congression-
ally-enacted International Banking Act, Florida's International
Banking Law continues to display features which might continue to
attract applicants. Foremost is the absence of reserve requirements.
Also to be considered in this regard is the growing preference for
state as opposed to federal regulation. Clearly though, the federal
statutes offer greater opportunity for expansion and a base for wider
market penetration.
V. STATE LIMrTATIONS ON OUT-OF-STATE BANKS
A. BT Investment Managers, Inc. v. Lewis
The extent to which a state may exclude an out-of-state bank
holding company from establishing nonbanking subsidiaries within
its boundaries has come under serious challenge.' In this regard,
two Florida statutes which attempted to exclude out-of-state non-
banking concerns were recently declared unconstitutional' as being
violative of the commerce clause.' The statutes in question prohib-
ited nondomiciliary corporations from furnishing investment advi-
sory services' and exercising various trust powers 5 and duties
within the state.
The controversy arose when Bankers Trust New York Corpora-
tion, a bank holding company organized under the laws of New
York, attempted to engage de novo in certain investment advisory
activities through a wholly owned subsidiary in Palm Beach, Flor-
170. See 44 Fed. Reg. 10,509 (1979). See also text accompanying notes 163-170 supra.
171. See BT Inv. Managers, Inc. v. Lewis, 461 F. Supp. 1187 (N.D. Fla. 1978).
172. Id. at 1201.
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
174. FLA. STAT. § 659.141(1) (1977). The pertinent parts of this statute provide that:
no bank, trust company, or holding company, the operations of which are princi-
pally conducted outside this state, shall acquire, retain, or own, directly or indi-
rectly, all or substantially all the assets of, or control over, any bank or trust
company having a place of business in this state where the business of banking
or trust business or functions are conducted, or acquire, retain, or own all, or
substantially all, of the assets of, or control over, any business organization having
a place of business in this state where or from which it furnishes investment
advisory services in this state.
175. FLA. STAT. § 660.10 (1977). The relevant provision in this statute provides as follows:
All corporations except banks and trust companies incorporated under the
laws of this state and having trust powers and except national banking associa-
tions located in this state and having trust powers, are prohibited from exercising
any of the powers or duties and from acting in any of the capacities, within this
state, as follows ....
The statute then goes on to list a number of fiduciary duties including, among others, acting
as an executor or administrator with certain exceptions, and acting as a guardian or acting
as a receiver.
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ida.'7" After notice of its proposal, but prior to approval by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as required by the Bank
Holding Company Act, the Florida Legislature enacted legislation
amending section 659.141.117 The effect of this amendment was to
generally prohibit the provision of investment advisory services in
Florida by out-of-state bank holding companies through control of
business subsidiaries having offices in Florida.' The Board denied
the application of Bankers Trust "' despite finding substantial evi-
dence indicating "that the celerity with which the legislation was
enacted is directly attributable to the pendency of the instant pro-
posal before the Board."'8 The denial was based upon a provision
in the Bank Holding Company Act which expressly reserved author-
ity in the states to adopt legislation within the exercise of their
powers and jurisdiction with respect to banks, bank holding com-
panies and their subsidiaries' and upon the Supreme Court
decision in Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans &
Trust Co. "I From this adverse decision by the Board, Bankers
Trust brought an action against Florida's comptroller challenging
the constitutionality of the amended statute.'83 Additionally, and
perhaps more significantly, Bankers Trust also attacked the consti-
tutionality of another Florida statute which antedated its efforts to
176. The subsidiary, BT Investment Managers, Inc., was a corporation organized under
the laws of Delaware and qualified to do business in Florida.
177. 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 72-96, § 1, as amended by 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 72-726 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 659.141(1) (1977)).
178. See note 175 supra.
179. Bankers Trust New York Corp., 59 FED. REs. Bu.L. 364 (1973).
180. Id. at 366.
181. Section 7 of the Act provides as follows: "The enactment by the Congress of the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 shall not be construed as preventing any State from
exercising such powers and jurisdiction which it now has or may hereafter have with respect
to banks, bank holding companies, and subsidiaries thereof." 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1976).
182. 379 U.S. 411 (1965). In Bankers Trust the Board interpreted Whitney as expressly
instructing it "to consider the applicability and effect of any such [state] legislation." The
primary issue in Whitney dealt with the jurisdiction of the Comptroller of Currency to author-
ize the opening of a new national bank which was a subsidiary of a bank holding company.
In holding that such jurisdiction was vested in the Federal Reserve Board the Court sug-
gested, in dicta, that the Board should consider a recently enacted state law which prohibited
branch banking in its determination.
183. When Bankers Trust initially brought this action its case was dismissed without
prejudice in a decision based upon the abstention doctrine. BT Inv. Managers, Inc. v. Lewis,
379 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Fla. 1973). On appeal this decision was reversed by the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which held that abstention was improper. Finding no special
state competence, overriding state interest or threat to Florida's administration of its own
affairs, the court determined that the constitutionality of the Florida statute could be prop-




gain entry into the state. Section 660.10 of the Florida Bank Code
established a bar to all corporations except banks and trust compa-
nies incorporated in Florida and national banks located in Florida
from exercising various trust powers and duties within the state."4
A three judge district court found the statutes discriminatory
in nature and, as such, invalid per se as a violation of the commerce
clause.' To reach this characterization of the challenged legisla-
tion, the critical inquiry to the court was whether the statutes were
basically "protectionist" measures, or whether they could be fairly
viewed as laws directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects
upon interstate commerce that would be only incidental.' While
the court recognized that there might be legitimate legislative inter-
ests in attempting to prevent undue concentrations of power and
diminished competition in the Florida investment advisory and
trust markets, it did not find a need here to balance between local
concerns and interstate impact."87 In light of the history behind the
enactment of section 659.141(1) and the lack of any evidence which
demonstrated that foreign investment advisory services or trust
firms posed any greater danger to the competitive environment in
Florida than did local firms, it was not difficult for the court to view
the statutes as "economic protectionist" legislation.'
To survive constitutional scrutiny under the commerce clause,
legislative efforts must have an evenhanded impact upon both in-
state and out-of-state firms. The court in BT Investment Managers
confidently asserted that the two Florida statutes involved did not
meet this standard. As to section 659.141(1) the court concluded
184. FLA. STAT. § 660.10 (1977); see note 175 supra.
185. BT Inv. Managers, Inc. v. Lewis, 461 F. Supp. 1187, 1201 (N.D. Fla. 1978). The
court based its decision on City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 S. Ct. 2531 (1978), a case
decided last term by the Supreme Court which defined a "virtually per se rule of invalidity."
regarding economic protectionist legislation. See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HkAv.
L. REv. 57 (1978). See also H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 530-39 (1949);
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1935).
186. 461 F. Supp. at 1195-98. This is the two level analysis which the Supreme Court,
in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 S. Ct. 2531, 2536 (1978), established as the evalua-
tion standard for determining the permissible limits of state regulation affecting interstate
commerce.
187. 461 F. Supp. at 1197-98.
188. Id. at 1196. In considering the discriminatory aspects of this legislation the court
quoted a finding of the Federal Reserve Board wherein the Board stated:
"It is beyond question, and BTNYC and the protestants are in agreement, that
the notice that BTNYC published in September, 1972, triggered the action of the
Florida legislature in this case and that the newly-enacted legislation was primar-
ily motivated by the threat of BTNYC's entry into the Florida investment advi-
sory markets and was intended to prevent such entry."
Id. at 1198 (quoting 59 FED. REs. BLL. at 366).
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that it erected "an insuperable barrier to the entry of foreign-based
bank holding companies, through their subsidiaries, into the Florida
investment market."'89 Similarly, it found that section 660.10
"cordons off Florida trust companies from competition by out-of-
state concerns."'' 0 This decision raises serious questions as to the
constitutionality of other sections of the Banking Code which curtail
the activities of out-of-state institutions in Florida.'
9 '
While it appeared to the court that section 659.141(1) was en-
acted as a reaction to the application of Bankers Trust,'2 section
660.10 was not so construed. That section, which limited many trust
activities within the state to banks and trust companies incorpo-
rated in Florida,' 8 is similar in nature to legislation in a number of
other states."' No doubt, it is true that states have a legitimate
interest in assuring that corporate fiduciaries serve the public faith-
fully. Laws which attempt to regulate a fiduciary's financial re-
sources, govern their conduct and define their responsibilities are
certainly within the scope of this interest. The extent to which this
can be accomplished through parochial legislation which requires
that certain trust functions be handled by state domiciliaries is
questionable after this decision.' 9 One thing seems certain though,
189. 461 F. Supp. at 1196.
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 659.57 (1977) (transactions of business by out-of-state bank-
ing corporations).
192. See 461 F. Supp. at 1193; 59 FED. Ras. BuLL. at 366; note 188 supra.
193. See note 175 supra.
194. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 1503 (West 1968); S.C. CODE § 21-13-320 (1976). But see,
e.g., N.Y. BANK. LAW. § 131 (McKinney 1971).
195. The Comptroller in BT Investment Managers attempted to obviate invalidation
under the commerce clause by arguing that Congress, through certain provisions of the Bank
Holding Company Act, had "affirmatively consented to Florida's prohibition on the entry of
foreign bank holding companies and their subsidiaries into this state." 461 F. Supp. at 1198.
This reasoning was based upon two specific provisions of the Act. 12 U.S.C. § § 1842(d), 1846
(1976). Under § 1846 Congress provided for a reservation of certain rights to the states. It was
this section which the Federal Reserve construed as effective to deny it authority to approve
Bankers Trust's application originally. See note 181 supra, The court interpreted this lan-
guage to mean merely that the state was not dispossessed of any regulatory authority which
it held prior to the enactment of the Bank Holding Company Act. It did not grant authority
to the states to promulgate legislation which would otherwise violate the commerce clause.
461 F. Supp. at 1199. See generally Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946)
(Congress may approve regulation by the states that would otherwise offend the commerce
clause under its power over interstate commerce).
The second section of the Act which the Comptroller relied upon expressly prohibits
Federal Reserve approval to holding companies seeking to acquire additional banks in any
state in which the business of its subsidiaries is not principally conducted, unless that state
permits such acquisition by specific statutory authorization. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1976).
Notwithstanding the express language of the statute, the Comptroller argued that an imper-
missible loophole would be created if bank holding companies could expand their operations
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generic arguments about traditional state regulatory power, preven-
tion of undue concentration of economic resources, diminished com-
petitive effects and superior qualification of domestic corporations,
unsupported by specific evidence, will not be sufficient to sustain
legislation which has an uneven impact upon foreign financial insti-
tutions to the advantage of their in-state cousins.
Clearly, we may reasonably expect a flurry of indirect invest-
ment advisory activity by out-of-state banks as a result of this deci-
sion, to the chagrin of the Florida Bankers Association. 9 ' Indeed, a
number of out-of-state bank holding companies have established or
are in the process of establishing interstate banking networks., 7
When considered in light of other recent legislative developments
discussed elsewhere herein, the fear of a national banking system
becomes compelling. Another consequence of the decision may be
that other sections of the Banking Code which curtail the activities
of foreign institutions in Florida will be similarly subjected to at-
tack. 191
B. Federal Reserve Board Consideration of State Legislation
In a recent case before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Florida Association of Insurance Agents challenged the Federal Re-
serve Board's approval of proposals by three bank holding compa-
nies to acquire interests in insurance agencies in Florida. 9 , Subse-
quent to a review of these applications by an administrative law
judge, but prior to the decisions by the Federal Reserve, the Florida
Legislature enacted legislation which generally prohibited financial
institutions from engaging in insurance agency activities.0 0 The
court reversed and remanded the decisions of the Board concluding
that they had failed to adequately consider the effects of the new
into nonconsenting states through nonbanking subsidiaries. Relying upon the language of the
Act and its legislative history, the court rejected this analysis. Since the word "bank" was
specifically defined in the statute, it would fly in the face of the plain meaning of the Act's
language to read "nonbanking subsidiaries" into its definition of a bank. Accordingly, the
court concluded that this section of the Act provided no authority for the proposition that a
state may bar foreign bank holding companies from acquiring nonbanking subsidiaries within
its boundaries. 461 F. Supp. at 1200.
196. The Florida Bankers Association appeared in the case as amicus curiae aligned with
the defendant.
197. See Arenson, A Bank Bridge Over State Lines, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1979, § D, at
1, Col. 5.
198. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 659.57 (1977).
199. Florida Aso'n of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 591
F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1979).
200. See 1974 Fla. Laws ch. 74-35 (codified at FiA. STAT. § 626:988 (1977)).
19791
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Florida statute.201
There was no allegation of discriminatory treatment, nor was
the validity of the statute challenged. The legislation involved made
no distinction between domestic and foreign corporations in pre-
scribing its prohibition. To that extent, the decision does stand for
the proposition that state regulation cannot be ignored by the Board
when it evaluates applications for acquisition of nonbanking subsid-
iaries under the Bank Holding Company Act.
The degree to which a state statute must be considered by the
Board was a matter which concerned the court. In this regard it
asserted that "casuistic predictions" about the effect of the law or
any resulting public benefits which might stem from the proposal
would be insufficient to sustain a decision by the Board.22 A "more
detailed inquiry," it concluded, is mandated by the Bank Holding
Company Act.
23
The court, in requiring the Board to more adequately consider
the state statute, presumed it to be valid. It based its decision,
which compelled a more detailed inquiry, on the public benefits
test, which is the Board's standard for evaluating any acquisition
of a nonbanking subsidiary. The court did not consider, as the dis-
trict court did in BT Investment Managers, the various sections of
the Bank Holding Company Act relating to the remaining vestiges
of state regulatory authority. 20' As a result, the question of whether
the Board, when referring to state regulatory schemes in evaluating
applications before it, may condition deference to state law on its
opinion of the constitutionality of that law, remains unanswered.
Read in conjunction, BT Investment Managers25 and Florida
Association of Insurance Agents2" perhaps shed some light into the
interstices of the dual regulatory scheme which governs the activi-
ties of nonbanking subsidiaries. It would seem that as long as a state
makes no distinction between in-state and out-of-state firms, its
regulation must carefully be considered by the Federal Reserve
Board. Where distinctions are made, the courts will view with criti-
cal suspicion any purported justification for the distinction. More-
over, state authority to regulate evenhandedly in this area may not
201. 591 F.2d at 342-43.
202. Id. at 339-40.
203. Id. at 340.
204. The sections of the Bank Holding Company Act which expressly deal with the
permissible limits of state regulation are sections 3(d) and 7. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(d), 1846
(1976). See note 195 supra.
205. 461 F. Supp. 1187.
206. 591 F.2d 334.'
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be overriden by the Board, nor may it be casually treated. As of yet,
however, the Board has no specific judicial or statutory authority to
ignore state legislation which is blatantly unconstitutional although
BT Investment Managers may provide a basis fo0-that position.0 7
C. Direct Mortgage Lending by Out-of-State Banks
In 1977, staff counsel for the Comptroller of Florida was asked
to consider whether out-of-state banks would be prohibited by Flor-
ida law from transacting a banking or trust or establishing branch
offices within the state.208 Although staff counsel's conclusion that
prohibitions exist as to both activities was not surprising, the
breadth of the opinion rendered causes some concern. Notwith-
standing the recent opinion in BTInvestment Managers as to trust
activities, ' the opinion of staff counsel continues to haunt us.110
Particularly alarming is staff counsel's interpretation of section
659.57, which follows:
Section 659.57, F.S., is a specific provision dealing with out-of-
state banking corporations. Generally, subsection (a) thereof per-
mits out-of-state banks (or foreign banks) to engage in the follow-
ing limited activities:
(a) Acquiring a part or an entire interest in any loan
which another person makes, has made or will make;
(b) Entering into mortgage servicing contracts with
persons authorized to transact such business in this
state; or
(c) Acquiring, holding, leasing, mortgaging or convey-
ing property in this state which was heretofore or which
may hereafter be assigned, mortgaged or conveyed to it
as security for a loan with regard to any business author-
ized by this section.
Under the above section, it is my opinion that a foreign bank
cannot contract for or make a direct mortgage loan in this state,
since the transaction permitted in (c) above must be authorized
by this section. It follows then, if direct loans are not otherwise
207. See generally 461 F. Supp. 1187.
208. Letter from William B. Corbett, Assistant General Counsel, to George E. Lewis,
Comptroller of Florida (Feb. 14, 1977) (inter-office communication) [hereinafter cited as
Letter to Comptroller]. The question was phrased as follows: "What provisions of the Florida
Banking Code (or other laws) prohibit foreign banks from transacting a banking or trust
business in this state or from establishing branch offices in this state?" Id. at 1.
209. 461 F. Supp. 1187.
210. Brown, Corporate Workouts, 32 U. M"AMi L. Riy. 979, 988-89 (1978).
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LA W RE VIE W
permitted under (a) and (b) thereof, foreign banks cannot make
direct loans in this state."'
The preceding analysis is subject to critical attack on at least
two levels. First;-if pursuant to subsection (b) a bank may enter into
mortgage servicing contracts,"' it must follow that out-of-state
banks are implicitly authorized to take mortgages on property situ-
ated in Florida. Second, a careful reading of section 659.57 reveals
that staff counsel ignored a key phrase within subsection (c).213 This
subsection expressly permits an out-of-state bank to maintain or
transfer any interest in property located within Florida which it
acquired "as security for or .. .in satisfaction of, a loan or loans
made by it or obligations acquired by it in the transaction of any
business authorized by this section."21' By failing to consider the
disjunctive "or," staff counsel assumed that subsection (c) necessar-
ily had to be read in light of other authorizations within the statute
rather than as an authorization provision itself. If due recognition
is given to the language preceding the disjunctive, however, it be-
comes clear that an out-of-state bank does, indeed, have authority
to contract for or make a direct mortgage loan in Florida. Moreover,
the recent decision in BT Investment Managers denouncing eco-
nomic protectionist legislation which distinguishes between in-state
and out-of-state firms as unconstitutional,"'2 suggests that any other
applications of the section may also be unconstitutional.
It is important to note that any domiciliary prerequisites which
flow from section 659.57, regardless of what interpretation is given
its language, would be immaterial with respect to international
banks which operate as federal agencies in Florida."' Because fed-
eral law permits federal agencies to conduct lending activities com-
parable to those in which national banks within the state may en-
gage, limitations on mortgage lending in Florida would be inappli-
cable as to them.
21 7
VI. CREDIT UNION SHARE DRAvrs
Share draft accounts, which are akin to automatic transfer ac-
counts used by commercial banks and transaction accounts used by
211. Letter to Comptroller at 2-3; see FLA. STAT. §§ 659.57(l)(a)-.57(l)(c) (1977).
212. FLA. STAT. § 659.57(1)(b) (1977).
213. Id. § 659.57(1)(c).
214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. 461 F. Supp. 1187; see text accompanying notes 171-197 supra.
216. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 4, 92 Stat. 610.
217. Id.; see text accompanying notes 130-37 supra.
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federally chartered savings and loan associations, are presently
fashionable among credit unions."' Essentially, share drafts are a
means of withdrawing savings from a credit union. The drafts them-
selves look much like checks, and can be negotiated and processed
like checks. The difference, of course, is that until funds are with-
drawn from a credit union bank share draft, interest accrues at a
rate of up to six and three-quarters percent annually.21
Recently, share draft programs have come under attack by the
Florida Bankers Association."' In upholding the validity of these
programs, the district court of appeal looked to the statute which
authorizes the existence of credit unions and defines their powers.22'
Finding the statute silent on the question of how credit union mem-
bers might withdraw their deposits, the court concluded that share
drafts were merely one method.222 Thus, credit unions which are not
forbidden to engage in share draft programs by their own bylaws,
may lawfully honor drafts on members' funds in their share ac-
counts. The Florida Bankers Association reportedly plans to appeal
this decision.n
VII. DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAXES
Lenders and borrowers boasted of a short-lived victory over the
Department of Revenue in 1978. In a declaratory action"4 the Miami
National Bank challenged the validity of the Department's position
that documentary stamp taxes are due on the full amount of an
obligation, and not just the increased portion, where the debtor
borrows additional sums from the same lender and executes a new
note evidencing the entire outstanding debt. 25 To determine the
218. FLORIDA TREND, October 1978, at 43.
219. Share drafts have been categorized as "a sophisticated means of withdrawing sav-
ings from a credit union." Id.
220. Florida Bankers Ass'n v. Leon County Teachers Credit Union, 359 So. 2d 886 (Fla.
1st DCA 1978).
221. See FLA. STAT. §§ 657.01-.247 (1977).
222. 359 So. 2d at 890. In this case the court had before it a final order by the Department
of Banking and Finance which was also a party to the suit. This order stated that withdrawals
by means of share drafts were not part of the incidental powers necessary to effectively carry
on business. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 657.04(8) (1977). The Department argued that an
administrative rule would be necessary to permit this particular withdrawal method. While
the court disagreed with the Department's position, it did suggest that the Department could
promulgate a rule through appropriate administrative procedure which could eliminate share
draft programs by credit unions. 359 So. 2d 890-90.
223. FLORIDA TREND, October 1978, at 43.
224. Department of Revenue v. Miami Nat'l Bank, 354 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
225. Id. at 85. But see [1963-1964] FLA. Ar'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 209. See generally
FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 12B-4.54 (1977) (exempt transactions).
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applicable law the parties agreed upon the following factual situa-
tion:
A borrows $19,' 000 from the bank. A signs a promissory note for
$10,000 and afffixes documentary stamps thereto representing the
full $10,000.
Subsequently, A borrows an additional $5,000 from the bank. A
signs a promissory note for $15,000-the amount of the $15,000
representing the original borrowed amount of $10,000 plus the
newly borrowed amount of $5,000. The bank attaches the old note
for $10,000 to the new note and A affixes documentary stamps
representing the $5,000 increase."
The court affirmed the trial court's holding that the renewal portion
of the example note was not subject to documentary stamp taxation
since it fell within the exemption for renewal of existing promissory
notes.2-
Unfortunately, however, the Supreme Court of Florida quashed
the district court of appeal's decision upon review and remanded the
case to the trial court .2 The supreme court concluded that section
201.09 is not ambiguous in its declaration that the exemption from
taxation pertains to a renewal promissory note which "only extends
or continues the identical contractual obligations of the original
promissory note . . .and without enlargement in any way of said
original contract and obligation. ' 2 The court would not concern
itself with the bank's contention that had the transaction in issue
involved three promissory notes (i.e., the original $10,000 note, a
renewal $10,000 note, and a new $5,000 note) only the note for $5,000
would have required new documentary stamps.30
In another development in this area, the Attorney General of
Florida has clarified that documentary stamp taxes on "open-end
mortgages" are to be based upon the fixed amount of the initial or
original debt or obligation and not upon the maximum amount
which could be advanced under the terms of the mortgage.2 31 Such
future advances or loans are only taxable when made. 32 As a result
of the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Miami National
226. 354 So. 2d at 84. For the statute imposing the documentary tax, see FLA. STAT. §
201.08(1) (1977).
227. 354 So. 2d at 85-86; see FLA. STAT. § 201.09 (1977).
228. State of Florida, Dept. of Rev. v. Miami Nat'l Bank, Case No. 53, 136 (3d DCA,
June 7, 1979).
229. Department of Revenue v. McCoy Motel, Inc., 302 So. 2d 440, 443 (Fla. 1st DCA
1974).
230. See 354 So. 2d 84.




Bank,23 however, it may not be acceptable to roll the amount of the
original debt or obligation and the amount of future advances or
loans into a single instrument as the latter are made, and to merely
affix documentary stamps representing such future advances or
loans.
VIII. PREPAYMENT CHARGES
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has recently held,
in a case of first impression, that when a loan agreement between a
borrower and a lender does not contain a provision for premature
termination, a charge to the borrower upon his voluntary fulfillment
of the obligation prior to maturity does not constitute interest.2 34
The case involved a substantial prepayment charge which the
debtor paid under protest and then challenged under the usury
statute.2 The court, however, characterized this prepayment as
consideration for the borrower's voluntary termination of the loan
agreement prior to its maturity. Thus, it decided that the usury laws
were not applicable.2 3 Although the lender in this case admitted
that the prepayment charge was calculated by applying the rate of
interest specified in the agreement to the minimum loan balance for
the remainder of the original financing period,27 the court noted
that the manner in which the lender computed the charge did not
affect its status as consideration. 23 The determinative factor to the
court, however, was the lack of a provision for premature termina-
tion in the original agreement.?'
IX. PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTERESTS
Florida's version of the Uniform Commercial Code240 has been
amended to curb further judicial erosion of the general rules of
priority among secured creditors .211 Specifically, sections 679.312(3)
233. See 354 So. 2d at 86.
234. American Wood Prods., Inc. v. Walter E. Heller & Co. Southeast, 358 So. 2d 1149
(Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
235. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 687.03 (1977) (interest usurious at a rate in excess of 15% per
year).
236. 358 So. 2d at 1150-51 (termination transaction was the antithesis of a loan and did
not involve giving of credit).
237. The parties had agreed that the borrower would maintain a minimum loan balance
with the lender until such time as the agreement terminated in accordance with its provisions.
Id. at 1150.
238. Id. at 1151.
239. Id.
240. FLA. STAT. §§ 671.101-680.105 (1977).
241. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-222 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 679.312(3)-.312(4) (1977)).
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and (4) have been amended to provide that unless a purchase money
security interest is perfected in the time and manner prescribed,
such interest will not be afforded any special priorities, but rather
will be relegated to the general rules of priority."'
The real gist of the amendments is reflected in the preamble of
the Senate bill, wherein it is expressly stated that the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Florida in International Harvester Credit Corp.
v. American National Bank of Jacksonville,13 is repealed to the
extent that it is inconsistent with the perfection requirements of
section 679.312.244 In that case the court held that as between a
secured party claiming under an after-acquired property clause and
a purchase money secured party who failed to perfect within the ten
day grace period, the former's interest in the after-acquired property
attaches only to the extent of the "debtor's equity" in the prop-
erty.
245
Since the notion of "debtor's equity" is foreign to the Uniform
Commercial Code,2" International Harvester created a judicial ex-
ception which generated considerable criticism.2 47 Most authorities,
including the Permanent Editorial Board for the Code, were in com-
plete accord with the lengthy dissenting opinion filed by then Chief
Justice Carlton.245 In his dissent, the Chief Justice chastised the
court for its failure to interpret the Code in simple literal fashion,
and declared that the priorities to be given competing security inter-
ests were matters for legislative determination. 4 The amendments
emphatically demonstrate legislative support for Justice Carlton's
analysis and bring Florida back to a state of uniformity with other
jurisdictions on this issue.
X. PRODUCTION OF EXAMINATION REPORTS
In Hialeah-Miami Springs First State Bank v. B. S.
Enterprises, the District Court of Appeal, Third District held that
insofar as reports of examinations conducted by the State Comp-
troller's Office and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation are
242. See id.
243. 296 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1974).
244. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-222 (introduced as FLA. S.B. 417, 1978 Reg. Sess.).
245. 296 So. 2d at 34-35.
246. See 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-222.
247. See, e.g., Note, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 384 (1975) (urging that this decision not be
followed in the future).
248. See, e.g., Burke, Annual Survey-Secured Transactions, 30 Bus. LAW. 893, 907
(1975); Note, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 384, 388-90 (1975).
249. 296 So. 2d at 35-37"(Carlton, C.J., dissenting).
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pertinent, they are discoverable in the course of litigation.5 0 Quali-
fying its decision, however, the court further held that as to the state
records, an in camera inspection by the trial judge is required, 5 ' and
as to the federal records, the party requesting production must seek
to obtain the records from the appropriate federal officials."2
The impact of this decision is perhaps more substantial than
the one page opinion would suggest. In the past, the discoverability
of examination reports has been an issue which the courts have
generally avoided. 5 ' The weighty policy decision involved is
whether to perpetuate traditional notions of liberal construction of
the discovery rules or confidentiality. This Third District opinion
suggests that the former is overwhelming the latter, which may
prove to be very embarrassing for bankers and frustrating for bank
counsel. Since reports of examinations concerning disputed loans
are typically written with the benefit of hindsight, bankers, as well
as bank counsel, can be expected to feel that they have little, if any,
protection from the disclosure of such reports. If one accepts the
presumption that banks do not issue loans with the expectation of
failure, one can imagine that bankers will view their lending deci-
sions as extremely vulnerable to attack given the Hialeah-Miami
Springs decision.
XI. CONCLUSION
The balance struck by the dual system of banking regulation
in this country has shifted significantly in favor of the federal
scheme during 1978. Florida, probably more than any other state,
because of its position as one of the leaders in the international
250. 353 So. 2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
251. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 658.10(2)(a) (1977) which provides:
Orders of courts or of hearing officers for the production of confidential re-
cords and information shall provide for in camera inspection by the court or the
hearing officer and shall be subject to further orders by the court or the hearing
officer to protect the confidentiality thereof, except to the extent deemed neces-
sary by the court or the hearing officer to protect the interests of all parties or
affected persons or the soundness of individual banks or the banking industry.
252. 353 So. 2d at 1244. Disclosure regulations of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion mandated by the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976) and promulgated
under the authority of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (1976) can be
found in 12 C.F.R. §§ 309.1-.7 (1978). 12 C.F.R. § 309.5(0 (1978) exempts "[riecords con-
tained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by or on behalf
of . . . the Corporation .... " However, 12 C.F.R. § 309.6(c)(8) vests discretion in the
Chairman of the Corporation's Board of Directors to authorize the disclosure of any informa-
tion which FDIC regulations exempt unless it is otherwise expressly prohibited by law.
253. See, e.g., Overby v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 224 F.2d 158 (5th Cir.
1955) (request for production not sufficiently specific).
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banking market, has already begun to feel the impact of this shift.
The increased presence of other types of financial institutions into
areas which have traditionally been the exclusive domain of banks
is also impacting on the banking community. Whether the fears
expressed by Florida bankers with regard to these changes are justi-
fied can only remain to be seen. The intensified competitive envi-
ronment brought on by these changes, however, should lead to new
and innovative practices among financial institutions in Florida
which should in turn inure to the benefit of the state's economy.
